ECONOMIC SANCTIONS-AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy, and there will be no need for force. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist.
-President Woodrow Wilson, 1919 The "War to end all Wars" with its catastrophic loss of life inspired world leaders to look for solutions other than war to solve problems. An optimistic and perhaps idealistic President
Wilson envisioned a "League of Nations" that would forswear war and use international economic sanctions to force nations to comply with the will of the international community. Prior to World War I, sanctions were normally a prelude to war. Neither the "League of Nations" nor sanctions ended up being the means to world peace. Despite President Wilson's best efforts, the United States Senate never ratified the treaty for participation in the League of Nations and without our involvement the League of Nations could not succeed. Sanctions, on the other hand, although they never reached the level of success that President Wilson envisioned, have become an important instrument of national security policy.
The United States government uses sanctions in a variety of forms to influence the actions of other governments. This study focuses on economic sanctions and explores the historical background of their use. It analyzes their effectiveness and compares and contrasts the use of sanctions against South Africa and Iraq. The study concludes with a discussion on the role of sanctions in a global economy and the realities facing policymakers as they consider the use of economic sanctions as tool to further our National Security Strategy.
DEFINITION OF SANCTIONS
Sanctions can either be economic or non-economic. Economic sanctions range from denying exports to a targeted country, stopping imports into the United States, or restricting the flow of capital. Non-economic sanctions focus on reducing government-to-government interaction (such as ending diplomatic contact, canceling meetings, or ending military to military contacts or programs) or civil contact (such as cultural or sporting events like the Olympics). 2 Sanctions are basically actions taken by a sender country against a target country "in response to wrongdoing by a state, such as an act of aggression against another state or pursuit of a racial policy that is considered wrong from the perspective of international law or moral standards." 3 While sanctions tend to be punitive in nature, they are usually not imposed as punishment but rather at a tool to coerce a change in the target country's behavior. 4 
US POLICY
While the use of sanctions is not explicitly discussed in our current national security strategy document, A National Security Strategy far a New Century their use to further our interests are certainly implied throughout the document. We consider the use of sanctions as a tool to further our interests in every major policy area from arms control and nonproliferation, technology export controls, to promoting democracy and human rights. 5 Further, the most While the use of sanctions has grown, their success rate as a tool for policymakers is questionable. In fact, just defining success has been a significant study topic for academicians.
One major study from Brown University states, "Much depends on the goals of sanctions, the context in which they are adopted, and the manner in which they are implemented. Evaluation of effectiveness can benefit from generalizations that have emerged from empirical research in recent decades; these provide the major categories for reviewing political expectations and results." 10 Most sanction studies have concluded that the measured "success" rate for sanctions is less than 50%. Further, they find that sanctions are seldom an effective means of forcing or coercing a government to act in the manner that we desire. Sanctions serve multiple purposes, each requiring separate assessments. Beyond officially declared purposes, other objectives can be identified: establishing deterrence, demonstrating resolve to allies or domestic constituents, sending symbolic messages, and enhancing respect for international norms. These objectives are often more easily accomplished than changes on the ground. When sanctions are meant as a signal of international disapproval of a particular regime or its abusive behavior, for instance, leaders can cite the solidarity of the states imposing the sanctions as a signal of success .
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In today's global economy, policy makers must consider several key factors before applying sanctions. If one assumes that we can enforce the sanction, the first consideration is whether the sanction will change the behavior to our satisfaction. For example, the sanctions that the United States government applied on Cuba are extremely restrictive, but they have failed in their main objective of bringing about a change in government. In fact, many would argue that we are punishing the people of the country while not affecting the leadership. The sanctions on both countries had little visible effect because they were not particularly concerned with diplomatic relations and conducted almost no business with the United States. 14 The second consideration in the imposition of sanctions is whether they will be effective without support from other countries of the world. Other countries might take advantage of the situation to increase their own trade interests. This occurred when President Carter imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan. Every major western country joined the United States in its condemnation of the invasion, but none joined in the embargo. As a result, the embargo failed.
The embargo was unilateral, reducing U.S. grain exports to the Soviet Union from an expected 25 million metric tons to 8 million metric tons (the amount required under pre existing commitments) in 1980. Nevertheless the Soviet ,r-£\ Wa !L able t0 expand its total 9 rain im P°r ts from 31 million metric tons in 1979 to 40 million metric tons in 1982 because Argentine, Canadian and European exports to the Soviet Union grew from 9.4 million metric tons to 23 million metric tons over the same period. 15 Finally, policy makers must consider second and third order effects of sanctionsprimarily how they will effect our economy. In the case of the grain embargo, American farmers lost an estimated $2. helped persuade a delinquent state to change policies unacceptable to the international community; they were not effective in provoking immediate compliance." 27 Nevertheless, the sanctions against South Africa offer several important lessons learned:
x • Consensus from major industrial countries for significant UN sanctions took more than 10 years to develop.
• Concerns about humanitarian suffering were mitigated by the fact that the ANC (the sufferers) pushed vehemently for additional sanctions.
• The government of South Africa resisted the economic pressure of significant economic sanctions for 6 years and of lesser sanctions for almost 20 years.
• Worldwide public sentiment and commercial sector condemnation added significant pressure.
SANCTIONS AGAINS IRAQ
Iraq's attack and occupation of Kuwait the first week of August 1990 were quickly followed by almost worldwide condemnation and economic sanctions that literally shut down all exports and imports less food and humanitarian supplies. One expert speaking on the financial costs to Iraq stated that the "An economy that had advanced to the front ranks of the developing world has been rapidly relegated to a preindustrial state...Total value of lost oil revenues from the seven years of sanctions [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] has been estimated at more than $130 billion." A year later, the regime formally recognized the redrawn borders....these important concessions were brought about in part by Baghdad's desire to have sanctions lifted. 31 On the other hand,-David Courtright and George Lopez in an article for the Fourth Freedom Forum argue that the objectives for the sanctions in Iraq have changed or suffered a version of mission creep and that compliance with the UN resolutions may no longer satisfy the US and some of our coalition partners. 32 He states:
The political goalposts have been moved. The regime has ignored several opportunities to increase the limits on oil sales for humanitarian supplies offered by the UN. Further, the regime focuses its energy and resources on building additional palaces and repressing any internal rebellion rather than reducing the suffering.
Cortright and Lopez write that:
The United States and its allies bear some responsibility [for the humanitarian suffering] due to their inability or unwillingness to ease sanctions in response to concessions noted earlier [partial compliance with the UN resolutions]. But the greatest ethical responsibility rests with the government of Iraq and its appalling disregard for human suffering. On one level, Baghdad's refusal to utilize the humanitarian safety net provided by the UN casts a long shadow of blame. At a higher level, the government has needlessly prolonged the crisis through its refusal to take steps toward further compliance with UN demands and by obstruction of UNSCOM's work. 37 As with the sanctions against South Africa, the sanctions against Iraq offer several important lessons learned:
• Comprehensive sanctions (even when backed up with military force) cannot force change in an authoritarian regime (particularly when it is the regime itself that you want to change).
• Policymakers must beware of changing objectives in the application of sanctions.
• Multi-lateral sanctions can have great impact on an economy but over time, the consensus of the coalition for sanctions will wane. Fourth, the humanitarian suffering caused by economic sanctions seems self-evident.
SOUTH AFRICA V. IRAQ
The poorest suffer worst. One might argue about the degree that they suffer but all agree that they suffer. In the case of South Africa, the ANC and black population that suffered the most almost demanded that the pain and suffering continue until apartheid ended. Policymakers who argued that economic sanctions hurt black South Africans more that the white minority ended up with no ground to debate and no propaganda tool when the ANC and prominent blacks like Desmond Tutu argued that no pain was too great when the cause was freedom and democratic rights. In Iraq, on the other hand, there is no opposition group similar to the ANC to advocate for additional sanctions and the humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people has become a wedge or propaganda tool for those who would end or limit the sanctions. Sanctions also stand to benefit from being understood in the context of carrotsand-sticks diplomacy...by themselves they have limited power and usually cannot force major changes in the policies of targeted regimes. As part of a broader diplomatic effort, however, they can make a difference. Too often, as in the case of Iraq, sanctions have become a policy unto themselves, a method of applying unrelenting coercive pressure even in the absence of meaningful dialogue or an overarching political strategy. 39 In the final analysis, sanctions are only another tool that policymakers should consider as they apply the elements of national power. Clausewitz in On War states, "We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." 40 The same can be said of sanctions, they offer policymakers an alternative more powerful than diplomatic language but less painful than war.
Sanctions in and of themselves do not provide solutions-seldom will they succeed by themselves.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Sanctions are a significant tool to compel other states or actors to comply with the wishes of the United States government. In most cases, they have been used without the application of the military force as an enforcement mechanism. The key to enforcement has been the use of multi-lateral sanctions. In those cases where we have convinced a significant number of other countries to join us in applying the sanctions, we have seen the greatest success. At the same time, policy makers must keep in mind that sanctions, while signifying our resolve or that of our friends to act, may not compel compliance with our wishes. Sanctions have not forced changes in government in either Cuba or Iraq. In both the cases, the hostile government has used the sanctions as a propaganda tool and disregards any hardships that the sanctions have caused. 
